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A. No.

JOHNY E. McCARROLL et
v. LOS ANGin,ES COUN'l'Y DISTIUC'r COUNCIL OI~' CARPENTERS
~
Labor- Remedies- Injunctive Relief.-If conduct
deemed to fall within the Labor
(29 U.S.
§§ 158 (a),
) , a state court has no
to grant injunctive relief
under either state or federal law, even if the National Labor
Relations Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
controversy.
Id.-Unfair Labor Practices.-Conduct that constitutes breach
of a collective bargaining contract is not for that reason alone
an unfair labor practice; enforcement of such contract should
be left to the usual processes of law, not to the National Labor
Relations Board.
[3] Id.-Unfair Labor Practices.-Thnt part of Labor Management Relations Act, § 8 (b) ( 4) (A) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b) ( 4) (A)),
making it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
to engage in or induce employees to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to "perform any service, where an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other
person . . . to cease doing business with any other person,"
contemplates the existence of a primary employer and a secondary employer and action by the union to induce employees
of the secondary employer to cease performing services for
him in order to compel him to stop doing business with the
primary employer, the ultimate object of the union's displeasure; it has no application where the conduct alleged consisted
in calling strikes of certain contractors' employees, and there
is no suggestion that employees of other employers, either
general contractors or subcontractors, were induced to refuse
to perform services.
[4] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-With reference to a complaint
alleging that as a result of activities of labor unions certain

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor,
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor,
149.
McK. Dig. References:
§ 3b; [10-17, 20, 28] Labor,
[23-27] Labor, § 3a.

§ 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, § 320

§ 79 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, §§ 148,
18, 19, 29] Labor,§ 25; (2-9] Labor,
§ 24; [21, 22] Arbitration, §§ 9, 15;
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contractors will acquire the reputation of being in labor difficulties and that general contractors will hesitate to do business with them, such an effect on secondary employers is always possible when there is a strike of the employees of a
primary employer, and is not prohibited by Labor Management Relations Act, §8(b)(4)(A) (29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(A)),
which permits unions to use such persuasion, whether by direct
solicitation or by indirect pressure, so long as pressure is not
brought on the customers by inducing strikes of their own
employees.
[5] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-A strike in violation of that
part of Labor Management Relations Act,§ 8(d) (4) (29 U.S.C.
§158(d)(4)), providing that where there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering employees in an industry
affecting commerce the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
the contract unless the party desiring such termination or
modification ''continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike . . . all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later," is an unfair labor practice, and a strike may
violate such statutory provision whether or not it also breaches
a no-strike prov1sion in a collective bargaining agreement; it
violates such statute when the union has not complied with
the notice requirements imposed thereby, including the requirement that there be no strike before expiration of the contract
or before a time provided in the contract for reopening negotiations.
[6] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-Not all strikes during the life
of a collective bargaining agreement are violations of Labor
Management Relations Act,§ 8(d) (4) (29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ( 4));
a strike called to protest an employer's own unfair labor
practice, for example, does not violate such statutory provision because it is not a strike aimed at terminating or
modifying the contract.
[7] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-The prohibition of Labor Management Relations Act, §8(d)(4) (29 U.S.C. §158(d)(4)),
is confined to "bargaining strikes"; it has no effect on whether
unions may validly strike over nonbargaining matters.
[8] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-When a collective bargaining
agreement is actually in force, Labor Management Relations
Act, § 8 (d) (4), prohibits strikes to compel changes in contractual relations at a time not contemplated by the parties,
since the assurance of stable labor relations during the life of
the contract is the principal incentive to entering such a contract in the first place.
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[9] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-A union may bind itself not
to engage in a strike for any purpose during the life of a
collective bargaining agreement, but it is only with strikes
used as a weapon in the bargaining process that Congress has
in Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(d) (29 U.S.C. § 158
(d)), shown sufficient concern to make them an unfair labor
practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board; a strike concerned with a subject
wholly ungoverned by the contract and outside the usual sphere
of collective bargaining does not constitute the unfair labor
practice of refusing to bargain.
[10] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.Labor Management Relations Act, § 30l(a) (29 U.S.C. § 185
(a)), providing that suits for violations of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce may be brought in any
federal district court having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the
parties, creates a federal substantive law governing collective
bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce, but state
courts are not necessarily ousted of jurisdiction to enforce
such law; if exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts be
neither express nor implied, the state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to enforce federal rights whenever, by their own
Constitution, they are competent to take it.
[11] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a) (29 U.S.C. § 185
(a)), merely declares that an action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in a federal
court, and enforcement of such agreements in state courts does
not conflict with any federal policy embodied in § 301 or any
other part of the federal statute.
[12] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.Labor Management Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185)
does not confide jurisdiction to one expert tribunal for the development of federal policy, but gives jurisdiction to all federal
district courts, and the possibility of conflict between state
and federal courts is no greater than the possibility of conflict
among the federal courts themselves, with uniformity ultimately dependent in either case on review by the United States
Supreme Court.
[13] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.Federal courts are no more expert than state courts in the
interpretation of contracts.
[14] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
over actions that can be brought in the federal courts under
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S. C. § 185) ;
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in

this

state courts are no
the federal law of "v''"~'""
bargaining agreements, or
the
of the litigants'
rights will
on the accident of the
in which the
action is brought.
!d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courte.actions
"'-~·»UHHng that federal courts cannot
Relations
u.s.c.
of the
"v'"'l!''w'u~·" with the strict re«~UllremE:n

to apply state

are not
since it is
not clear that
court to withhold
a remedy that would be available if the action arose under
the contract law of the state; Congress can compel a state
court to enforce a federal right and give a prescribed remedy
when it is essential to the full realization of the right, and
the state court would be competent under its own law to give
a remedy of like character for a right based on state law.
[16] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.A state court enforcing a federal right is not simply another
federal court.
[17] !d.-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-The NorrisLaGuardia Act is in terms drawn as a limitation on the federal courts; it did not limit the remedial power of state courts,
and could not constitutionally have done so since its prohibition was not restricted to injunctions in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce or any other subject over which Congress has paramount power.
[18] !d.-Remedies-Injunctive Relief.-Labor Management Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185), does not embody any policy
that requires a state court enforcing rights created by that
section to withhold injunctive relief; the principal purpose
was to facilitate enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by making unions suable as entities in the federal
courts, and thereby to remedy the one-sided character of existing labor legislation; it was not intended to abolish in state
courts equitable remedres that had been available, and leave
an employer in a worse position in respect to the effective enforcement of his contract than he was before the enactment
of § 301.
[19] !d.-Remedies-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief would
not impair any federal contract right nor expand it in conflict
with any policy that may be discerned in Labor Management
Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S. C. § 185) ; the principal purpose
of the statute is to encourage the formation and effective enforcement of collective
agreements, and restriction
on the remedies available in federal courts arises not from
any policy in the Labor Management Relations Act itself but
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from the Norris-LaGuardia
of which is confined
to the federal courts.
!d.-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-There is no
invariable
implicit in the federal system that a
state court
a federal right must not go beyond the
remedies available in a federal court; uniformity in the determination of the federal
itself is a necessity, but such
uniformity is not threatened because a state court can give
a more complete and effective
Arbitration- Agreements to Arbitrate- Effect.-The arbiof a dispute may itself be subject to arbitration if
have so provided in their contract, and in this situation the court should stay proceedings pending the arbiter's
determination of his own jurisdiction unless it is clear that
the claim of arbitrability is wholly groundless.
I d. -Agreements to Arbitrate- Effect.-When the parties
have conferred on an arbiter the unusual power of determining
his own jurisdiction, the court cannot avoid the necessity of
making a certain threshhold determination of arbitrability,
namely, whether the parties have in fact conferred this power
on the arbiter.
Labor-Arbitration.-It may be that leaving to an arbiter
the question of arbitrability is a desirable procedure from the
point of view of harmonious labor relations, but since it is
outside the usual understanding of the relations of court and
arbiter and their respective functions, it must be assumed
that the parties expect a court determination of arbitrability
unless they have clearly stated otherwise.
[24] !d.-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-Not all
strikes during the life of a contract are necessarily violations
of a no-strike clause, though on its face the prohibition appears to be absolute, and whether a collective bargaining agreement requires arbitration to determine if a union's conduct
violates the no-strike clause, or whether the court itself may
make this determination, depends on the intention of the
parties.
[25] Id. - Collective Bargaining Contracts - Arbitration. - The
parties to a collective bargaining contract did not contemplate
arbitration of a breach of a no-strike clause, though the arbitration provision stated that all grievances or disputes arising
between the parties over interpretation or application of the
agreement should be settled by the procedure set forth therein,
where such procedure was designed primarily to cope with
the usual employee complaint concerning working conditions,

[21] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 8 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Arbitration and Award, § 14 et seq.
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wrongful discharge and the like, and the parties did not intend that an employer would be required to follow these steps
in prosecuting his objection to a strike.
(26] !d.-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbitration.-Where
the grievance and arbitration procedure in a collective bargaining agreement was an alternative to the strike as a means
of settling disputes and assumed that work should go on, resort
to such procedure was designed to avoid the necessity of a
strike, not to adjudicate a strike once it occurred, and the
purpose of the procedure limits its applicability.
[27] !d.-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbitration.-Arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements may not
be construed broadly to cover all disputes between the parties
to the end that the contract will provide a complete system of
government for the parties, however attractive may be the
ideal, since it does not justify overriding the parties' intentions and forcing on them a method of decision wholly unexpected in its application.
[28] Id. -Remedies- Conditions Precedent.-Contractors suiag
labor unions and their officers for damages and injunctive
relief against strikes allegedly called by defendants were not
barred from maintaining the action for failure to have the
contractor's license required by Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 70257031, or the common-law rule that illegal contracts will not be
enforced, since § 7031 bars actions for the collection of compensation for contracting work, not actions to enforce collective bargaining agreements, and since plaintiffs' labor contract
was not prohibited by the licensing statute and its validity was
llllrelated to the question whether they could legally enter into
construction contracts.
[29] Id.- Remedies- Injunctive Relief.-In an action by contractors against labor unions and their officers for damages
and injunctive relief against strikes allegedly called by defendants, there was sufficient evidence to justify the issuance
of a preliminary injunction where defendants did not deny
the strike, the reasons for the strike were obscure, there was
some indication that defendants objected to plaintiffs on the
grounds that they were labor contractors and violating state
safety regulations, but defendants failed to explain precisely
what labor contracting is, to show that plaintiffs were engaged in it or that defendants were justified in striking rather
than resorting to the grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, where the evidence tended to show that
plaintiffs had not violated any state safety regulation, and
where there was substantial evidence to support plaintiffs'
claim that the strike was in breach of contract and that they
would be irreparably injured if it continued.
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting a preliminary injunction. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Garrett and James M. Nicoson for Appellants.
Hill, Farrer & Burrill and Ray L. Johnson,
spondents.

for Re-

Roth & Bahrs and George 0. Bahrs as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs are engaged in the contracting
business in the Los Angeles area. They brought the present
action against defendant labor unions and their officers for
damages and injunctive relief against strikes allegedly called
by defendants.
In their second amended complaint plaintiffs allege that
plaintiffs and defendants are parties to a collective bargaining
agreement known as the BCA-AF of L Master J_~abor Agreement. This agreement provides that a contractor shall have
complete freedom in hiring workmen, except that he must
first call on the local union having jurisdiction over the area
in which the contracting work is to be done to satisfy his
need for labor. The local union must immediately furnish the
required number of competent and skilled workmen, and if
after 48 hours notice it has failed to do so, the contractor is
free to obtain workmen from any available source. Furthermore, the contractor is permitted to transfer workmen up to
10 per cent of his current requirements in any craft from
the jurisdiction of one local union to the jurisdiction of
another local union. He may transfer more than 10 per cent
if permitted by the constitution and by-laws of the craft at
the time the collective bargaining agreement was entered
into. The by-laws of the Los Angeles County District Council
of Carpenters permit such a transfer up to 50 per cent of a
contractor's requirements, and also require a local union to
honor a contractor's request for specific workmen. The
agreement also provides that the unions will not call a strike
against a contractor during the life of the agreement, but that
all grievances or disputes over the interpretation or application of the terms of the agreement will be settled by a specified
grievance procedure and by arbitration.
The complaint further alleges that plaintiffs entered into
contracts to do the carpentry work on various construction

CARPENTERS

C.2d

area. Pursuant to the collective
called on defendant local
unions to supply them with workmen. The workmen sent to
plaintiffs were,
unskilled and incompetent, and
furthermore defendants informed
that they would
not be permitted to transfer workmen from the
of one local union to the
of another local union
in excess of 10 per cent of their current
Defendants also refused to honor
workmen or to
plaintiffs to transfer their regular
workmen from different
of Los Angeles County to
specific construction projects. Defendants ordered strikes
of plaintiffs' employees on specific construction projects, and
finally brought about a strike of all plaintiffs' employees.
The complaint alleges that the only reasons defendants
gave for their conduct were that plaintiffs are labor contractors
and are violating state safety regulations; that in fact plaintiffs are not labor contractors since they undertake to do
complete carpentry jobs and not merely to furnish workmen,
and that in any event labor contracting is prohibited neither
by law nor by the collective bargaining agreement; that a
state safety inspector found that plaintiffs were not violating
any state safety regulations; and that defendants' purpose
in calling strikes was to harass plaintiffs and totally destroy
their business.
Plaintiffs seek to state three causes of action : breach of the
collective bargaining agreement through a violation of the
no-strike clause, a tortious attempt to destroy plaintiffs' business without any legitimate labor objective, and a violation
of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16700-16758)
by restraining trade without any legitimate labor objective.
On the basis of the complaint, testimony, and numerous affidavits, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction against
defendants' calling or continuing a strike against plaintiffs,
and it is from this order that defendants appeal. In view of
our conclusion that the issuance of the injunction was justified by the breach of the collective bargaining agreement,
we do not find it necessary to consider the second and third
causes of action stated in the complaint.
Defendants first contend that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to issue its injunction because the National Labor
Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct
alleged in the complaint. [1] It is now well established
that if conduct may be reasonably deemed to fall within
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the Labor
Relations Act de:fin(29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)-(b)), a state
court has no
to
injunctive relief under either
state or federal
even if the National I1abor Relations
Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction over the con348 U.S. 468, 481
troversy. (Weber v.
S.Ct.
99 LEd.
; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
S.Ct.
1 hEd 2d 601] ; Charles H.
353 U.S. 1
Inc. v. Painters Local Union, 45 Cal.2d 677, 681
P.2d
.) The conduct alleged in the present case,
be deemed to fall within any of
the
of section 8 (b) of the federal act defining
unfair labor practices by unions. (29 U.S.C. § 158(b).)
[2] Conduct that constitutes a breach of a collective bargaining agreement is not for that reason alone an unfair labor
Proposals to make breach of contract an unfair
labor practice were before Congress when it enacted the
Taft-Hartley law, but were specifically rejected by the conference committee on the ground that once the parties had
entered into a collective bargaining agreement, enforcement
should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the
National Labor Relations Board. (See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. W estinghonse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 443-444 n. 2 [75 S. Ct. 488, 99 L.Ed. 510] (Mr.
Justice Frankfurter concurring); Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 243-245.)
[3] Defendants contend, however, that the conduct alleged
falls within the provisions of section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) (29 U.S. C.
§ 158 (b) ( 4)(A)), which make it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization "to engage in, or to induce or
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to ... perform any service, where an object thereof is .. .
forcing or requiring ... any employer or other person ... to
cease doing business with any other person . . . . '' This prohibition contemplates the existence of a primary employer
and a secondary employer, and action by the union to induce
the employees of the secondary employer to cease performing
services for him in order to compel him to stop doing business
with the primary employer, the ultimate object of the union's
displeasure. It has no applieation to the present case since
the conduct alleged consisted in calling strikes only of plaintiffs' employees, and there is no suggestion that employees
of other employers, either general contractors or subcon-

54

McCARROLL v. L . .A. CouNTY ETC. CARPENTERS [49 C.2d

tractors, were induced to refuse to perform services. (See
International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. National La,bor
Rela-tions Board, 341 U.S. 694, 698-706 [71 S.Ct. 954, 95
L.Ed. 1299]; Na-tional Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg.
& Constr. Tr·acles Council, 341 U.S. 675, 685-690 (71 S.Ct.
943, 95 L.Ed. 1284]; National Labor Relations Board v. International Rice
341 U.S. 665, 670-673 (71 S.Ct. 961,
95 L.Ed. 1277] ; National La-bor Relations Boa-rd v. General
Drivers (5th Cir.), 225 F .2d 205, 208-209, cert. denied, 350
100 L.Ed. 801].)
U.S. 914 [76 S.Ct.
[4] The complaint does allege that as a result of defendants' activities plaintiffs will acquire the reputation of being
in labor difficulties, and that general contractors will hesitate
to do business with them. Such an effect on secondary employers, however, is always possible when there is a strike
of the employees of a primary employer, and is not prohibited
by section 8 (b) ( 4) (A). One of the usual purposes of any
strike is to make it more difficult for an employer to do
business by persuading customers not to deal with him.
Section 8(b) (4) (A) permits unions to use sueh persuasion,
whether by direct solicitation of the customers or by indirect
pressures of the kind alleged in the present case, so long as
pressure is not brought on the customers by inducing strikes
of their own employees. (National Labor Relations Boa-rd v.
Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Board (2d
Cir.), 228 F.2d 553, 556-560, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 [76
S.Ct. 1024, 100 L.Ed. 1483); Rnbouin v. National La-bor Rela-tions BonTd (2d Cir.), 195 F.2d 906, 911-912.) Defendants'
interpretation of section 8(b) (4) (A) is contrary to the authorities and would change it from a prohibition against
secondary strikes and boycotts to a sweeping prohibition
against all strikes when an incidental effect is to persuade
customers not to deal with an employer.
Sections8(b)(3) and8(d) (29U.S.C. §§158(b)(3), (d))
furnish more substantial support for defendants' contention
that the complaint alleges conduct constituting an unfair labor
practice. Section 8(b) (3)provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization ... to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer.
" [5] Section 8 (d)
provides:
"to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the reprrsentative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and ronfer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
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of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested
either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collectivebargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or
modification" (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the
contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty
days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event
such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior
to the time it is proposed to make such termination or
modification;

"

"(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting
to strike ... all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given
or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later. . . . "
A strike in violation of section 8 (d) ( 4) is an unfair labor
practice, and a strike may violate 8 (d) ( 4) whether or not
it also breaches a no-strike provision in a collective bargaining agreement. A strike violates 8(d) (4) when the union
has not complied with the notice and waiting requirements
imposed by the statute, including the requirement that there
be no strike before the expiration of thr contract or before
a time provided in the contract for reopening negotiations.
(See National Labor Rdat·ions Boa1·rl v. Lion Oil Co., 352
U.S. 282 [77 S.Ct. 330, 332-336. 1 L.Ed.2d 331].)
[6] All strikes during the life of a collective bargaining
agreement, however, are not violations of 8 (d) ( 4). A strike
called to protest an employer's own unfair labor practice,
for example, does not violate 8 (d) ( 4) because it is not a
strike aimed at terminating or modifying the contract. (Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Natinnal Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S.
270, 285-286 [76 S.Ct. 349. 100 L.Ed. 309].) [7] The decision in the Mastro Plastics case, and language in the recent
Lion Oil case (77 S.Ct. at 335. and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurring and dissenting at 338-341). indicate that the prohibition of 8 (d) is confined to "bargaining strikes." Mr.
J·nstice Frankfurter points out, 8 (d) "has no effect on whether
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unions may
strike over
matters. u (77
'S.Ct. at 341.) The National Labor Relations Board in its
opinion in the Lyon Oil case makes it clear that its decision
"has no bearing on the right to strike for reasons and purposes
other than to obtain contract modification or termination.
We say only that strikes to alter the
of a firm
contract of fixed duration . . . must await the termination
date." (Lyon Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 680, 684; see also N ational Labor Relations Board v. Wagner Iron W arks & Bridge
Workers (7th Cir.), 220 F.2d 126, 141, cert. denied, 350 U.S.
981 [76 S.Ct.
467, 100 L.Ed. 850]; National Labor Relations Board v. Mastro Plastics Corp. (2d Cir.), 214 F.2d
462,465-466, aff'd, 350 U.S. 270 [76 S.Ct. 349, 100 L.Ed. 309];
Snively Groves, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1394, 1395; but cf. Local
3, United Packinghouse Workers v. National Labor Relations
Board (8th Cir.), 210 F.2d 325, 332-333, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 822 [75 S.Ct. 36, 99 L.Ed. 648] ; Penello v. International
Union, United Mine Workers (D.D.C.) 88 F.Supp. 935, 941.)
What is a "bargaining strike" in this sense depends on
the purpose of 8 (d). The federal act seeks to stabilize labor
relations by encouraging employers and unions to negotiate
and adhere to collective bargaining agreements covering the
usual subjects of labor relations, such as wages, hours, and
working conditions. To this end it compels employer and
union to substitute to some extent collective bargaining for
the economic weapons of strike and lockout as a means of
creating or altering contractual relations, on the theory that
collective bargaining is more likely to produce a workable
contract and avoid social and economic disruption. [8] When
a collective bargaining agreement is actnally in force, the
statute prohibits strikes to compel changrs in contractual relations at a time not contemplated by the parties, since the
assurance of stable labor relations during the life of the contract is the principal incentive to entering such a contract in
the first place. Thus the purpose behind section 8 (d) does
not encompass strikes whose aim is not to bring about a
change in contractual relations, such as a strike to compel an
employer to comply with his contract or to protest conduct
wholly ungoverned by the contract. [9] A union may of
course bind itself not to engage in a strike for any purpose
during the life of the agreement, but it is only with strikes
used as a weapon in the bargaining process that Congress
has in 8 (d) shown sufficient concern to make them an unfair
labor practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
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Labor Relations Board. (See Timken Roller
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (6th Cir.), 161 F.2d 949, 953955.)
If the allegations in the complaint are true, the reason
for the strike in the present case was either defendants' contention that plaintiffs are labor contractors and are violating
state safety
or the
of some of
the individual defendants toward
At no time did
defendants express dissatisfaction with the terms of the contract between the parties or inform plaintiffs of a desire to
modify it in any regard. The object of the strike appears to
have concerned a subject wholly ungoverned by the contract
and outside the usual sphere of collective bargaining. Since
it was not a strike to terminate or modify the contract, it
did not constitute the unfair labor practice of refusing to
bargain.
Since defendants' conduct as alleged cannot reasonably be
deemed an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of section 8 (b), it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a
court has jurisdiction to enjoin conduct that is in breach of a
collective bargaining agreement and at the same time may be
reasonably deemed an unfair labor practice. (See I ndependent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (3d Cir.),
235 F.2d 401; Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co. (4th
Cir.), 193 F.2d 529; Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 Colum.L.
Rev. 52; but see National Labor Relations Board v. Wagner
Iron Works & Br,idge Workers (7th Cir.), 220 F.2d 126, 137,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 [76 S.Ct. 466, 467, 100 L.Ed. 850] .)
[10] Defendants contend that even if this is not a case
over which the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive
jurisdiction, since it is an action for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. (29 U.S.C. § 185 (a).) Section 301
(a) provides that: "Suits for violations of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
From the time of its enactment the federal courts were
in continual disagreement as to whether section 301 required
the creation of a characteristically federal decisional law to
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govern collective bargaining agreements affecting interstate
commerce, or merely provided a federal forum for the enforcement of substantive rights grounded in the law of the states.
The majority of the lower federal courts held that section 301
created substantive rights based on federal law, and did not
merely confer jurisdiction. Some were persuaded to this
view by the fear that if section 301 were construed merely
to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it would eonfer upon them jurisdiction over cases not arising under the
laws of the United States, and thus exceed the scope of the
judicial power of the United States as defined in article III
of the federal Constitution. (See Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local
475, United Elec. etc. Workers (2d Cir.), 235 F.2d 298, 300,
cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. Week 3366 (U.S. June 10, 1957);
Shirley-Herma-n Co. v. International Hod Carriers (2d Cir.),
182 F.2d 806, 808-809; International Union of Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Canst. Co. (6th Cir.), 193 F.2d 470. 475;
United Elec. etc. Workers v. Oliver Corp. (8th Cir.), 205 F.2d
376, 384-385.)
Recently the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took
the position that the supposed constitutional difficulty did not
exist, since even if an action under 301 is based on state law,
the case arises under the laws of the United States for the
purposes of article III if federal court jurisdiction is necessary
to implement a congressional policy governing collective bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce. (International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d
576, 580-582, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21,
1 L.Ed.2d 37].) This view could have prepared the way
for an interpretation of 301 that preserved the application of
state law but provided a federal forum for suits against unions
that because of procedural obstacles could not be sued as
entities in the courts of many states. The extremely fragmentary legislative history and almost total absence of anv
direction in the statute as to the content of a federal substantive law gave considerable support to such an interpretation. (Textile Workers v. American Thread Co. (D.
Mass.), 113 F.Supp. 137, 139-141; see Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. W estingh01tse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 441-459 [75 S.Ct. 488, 99 L.Ed. 510] (Mr .•JnRtice
Frankfurter concurring and dissenting) ; Wollett and W ellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7
Stan.L.Rev. 445, 472-475; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 274, 303305.)
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The United States Supreme Court, however, has now authoritatively declared that section 301 creates a federal substantive
law governing collective bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce. (Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alaham a, 25 U.S.L. Week 4387 (U.S. June 3, 1957).) Although
the case before the Court concerned only the power of a
federal court to give a remedy not available under state lawspeeific t>nforcemcnt of an agreement to arbitrate-the majority opinion broadly states that "the substantive law to apply
in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law which the courts must
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.'' ''Federal
interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law.
I Citation.] But state law, if compatible with the purpose of
§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will
best effectuate the federal policy. [Citation.] Any state law
applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not
be an independent source of private rights." (25 U.S.L. Week
at 4389.)
It does not necessarily follow from a decision that federal
law governs the rights of the parties that state courts are
ousted of jurisdiction to enforce those rights. As Mr. Justice
Bradley stated in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 [23
L.Ed. 833], "[I] f exclusive jurisdiction [in the federal
courts] be neither express nor implied, the State courts have
concurrent jurisdiction [to enforce federal rights] whenever,
by their own constitution, they are competent to take it.''
Concurrent jurisdiction exists ''where it is not excluded by
express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising
from the nature of the particular case." (See Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 122-123 [194 P.2d
689].)
[11] Section 301 does not expressly exclude state courts.
On the contrary, it merely declares that an action for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in a
federal court. Surely if Congress had intended to exclude
state courts it would have used more forthright language.
Nor does enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in
state courts conflict with any federal policy embodied in
section 301 or any other part of the federal statute. Defendants contend that the rationale of Garner v. Teamsters
etc. Union, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228], and
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [75 S.Ct. 480,
99 L.Ed. 546], which excludes state court jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices in order that the National Labor
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Relations Board may be free to
consistent federal
exclude state court jurisdiction
over actions that could be brought under section 301. [12] Section 301, however, does not confide jurisdiction to one expert
tribunal for the
of federal policy, but on the
to all the federal district courts.
of conflict between state and federal courts is
no greater than the
of conflict among the federal
courts
with
ultimately dependent in
either case on review by the United States Supreme Court.
[13] Moreover, federal courts are no more expert than state
courts in the interpretation of contracts. (See Philadelphia
Marine Trade Assn. v. International Longshoremen's Assn.,
382 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 736-737], cert. denied, 350 U.S.
843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 7;'511 : General Elec. Co. v. International Union United Automobile etc. Workers, [Ohio Ct.
App.], 108 N.E.2d 211, 219-222, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio
St. 555 [110 N.E.2d 424] ; Wollett and Wellington, Federalism and B1·each of the Labor Agreement, 7 Stan.L.Rev. 445,
452-455; but cf. International Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local
343, Internationa1 Union United Automobile Workers, [D.
N.J.], 123 F.Supp. 683, 692; note, 57 Yale L.J. 630, 637
n. 24.)
[14] State courts therefore have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts over actions that can be brought in the
federal courts under section 301. It is obvious that in exercising this jurisdiction state courts are no longer free to apply
state law. but must apply the federal law of collective bargaining agreements, otherwise the scope of the litigants' rights
will depend on the accident of the forum in which the action
is brought. What the substantive federal law of collective
bargaining agreements is we cannot now know. Until it is
elaborated by the federal courts we assume it does not differ
significantly from our own law.
If in the present case it is not necessary to determine
wherein the substantive federal law differs from the law we
have until now applied, another problem does press for resolution: what remedies are available in a state court vindicating
rights created by section 301? It can be argued that since
federal courts in actions brought under 301 cannot enjoin
strikes in breach of a collective bargaining agreement because
of the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 104), state courts enforcing rights created by 301 likewise cannot issue an injunction and give a remedy not available in the federal courts.
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that section 301 authorSome courts have
izes even federal courts to use injunctive process for the
"full enforcement of the substantive rights created by section
301 (a) . . . , " apparently notwithstanding the restrictions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. (JJ:filk & Ice Cream Drivers
Milk Products
Cir.) 203 F.2d
Union v.
B50. 651.)
we do not pause to decide this question,
the better view would seem to be that the inclusion of specific
instances in the Labor Management Relations Act in which
injunctive relief is expressly authorized negatives any general
repeal of the Norris-La Guardia Act in respect to the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. (See W. L. Mead,
Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1st Cir.),
217 F.2d 6, 8-10, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21,
1 L.Ed.2d 37] ; Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers,
(S.D. Cal.), 114 F.Supp. 334, 340-341; United Packinghouse
Workers v. Wilson & Co., (N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 567568.) By its holding in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama, 25 U.S.L. Week 4387, 4389 (U.S. June 3, 1957),
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was never intended to prohibit
specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the Supreme
Court has not suggested otherwise ; strike injunctions clearly
were intended to fall under the ban of the act.
[15] If it is assumed that federal courts cannot enjoin
strikes in actions under section 301 save in compliance with
the strict requirements of the Norris-La Guardia Act, state
courts enforcing federal rights are not necessarily subject
to the same restraint. In the first place it is not entirely clear
that Congress can compel a state court to withhold a remedy
that would be available if the action arose under the contract
law of the state. Congress can compel a state court to enforce a federal right and give a prescribed remedy when it is
essential to the full realization of the right, and the state
court would be competent under its own law to give a remedy
of like character for a right based on state law. (Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 [67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967, 172 A.L.R.
225] ; Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal.2d 818, 836-851 [142
P.2d 297].) Moreover, in cases brought in state courts under
the Federal Employers Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §51 et seq.),
an area in which the most vexing problems of state enforcement of federal rights have arisen, it has been held that state
procedure must give way if it impedes the uniform application
of the federal statute essential to effectuate its purpose, even
though the procedure would apply to similar actions arising
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under state law. (E.g. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown
R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-364 [72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398] .)
It would be a step beyond these decisions, however, to
hold that a state enforcing a federal right can be compelled
to withhold a remedy usually available in its courts, although
it might be said that since Congress can completely exclude
state jurisdiction it can dictate that certain remedies be withheld if necessary to implement federal policy. Some light is
thrown on this question by Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 [64
S.Ct. 487. 88 r_,_Ed. 659]. In that case the court held that the
Federal Bankruptcy Act deprived a state court of power to
fix or grant fees to counsel for trustees, even though they had
performed services in actions before the court and under state
law were entitled to a lien on their client's cause of action.
(See also Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85 [59 S.Ct. 31, 83 L.Ed.
56).) This decision, however, does not settle the precise issue
before us, and a strong argument can be made that Congress
must take the state courts as it finds them in regard to the
availability of equitable remedies, and can require only that
they not discriminate against litigants enforcing federal
rights.
In the converse situation, when a federal court enforces
a state-created right and jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, it was established that the court could give an
equitable remedy not available under state law (Guffey v.
Smith, 237 U.S. 101 [35 S.Ct. 526, 59 L.Ed. 856); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-106 [65 S.Ct. 1464,
89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231) ), or withhold a remedy that
was available under state law. (Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen,
261 U.S. 491, 494-499 [43 S.Ct. 454, 67 L.Ed. 763].) Considerable doubt has been cast on the vitality of this doctrine
by decisions stressing more and more that the goal of diversity
jurisdiction is substantial similarity of outcome whether an
action is brought in a state or federal court, and that remedies
often go to the substance of the right. (E.g. Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202-204 [76 S.Ct. 273, 100
fJ.Ed. 199] ; cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-192
[67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832].) Whatever the implications of
diversity jurisdiction, however, they do not necessarily determine whether a state court, under the compulsion of the
supremacy clause, must withhold a specific remedy. [16] A
state court enforcing a federal right is not simply another
federal court. (Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211, 222 [36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961] .)
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The difficulties that inhere in the question of congressional
power to control equitable remedies available in state courts
strengthen our conviction that, whether or not Congress could
nn•~v•nn state courts of the power to give such remedies when
enforcing collective bargaining agreements, it has not attempted to do so either in the Norris-La Guardia Act or section 301.
[17] The Norris-La Guardia Act is in terms drawn as a
limitation on the courts of the United States. "No court
of the United States,'' declares section 1, ''shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute . . . , '' and a court of the
United States is defined in section 13 (d) as "any court of the
United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred
or defined or limited by Acts of Congress, including the courts
of the District of Columbia." (29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(d).)
'rhe statute aimed to restrict the federal equity power, and
was justified constitutionally on the basis of Congress' power
to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. (Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R.,
321 U.S. 50, 58, 63 [64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534, 150 A.L.R.
810] ; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 [58 S.Ct.
578, 82 L.Ed. 872].) It did not limit the remedial power of
the state courts (see United Elec. etc. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (E.D. Pa.), 65 F.Supp. 420, 422; General
Bldg. Contractors' Assn. v. Local Unions, 370 Pa. 73 [87
A.2d 250, 254] ; Markham & Callow, Inc. v. International
Woodworkers etc. Union, 170 Ore. 517 [135 P.2d 727, 746],
citing Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction at 220;
39 Ops. U.S. Atty. Gen. 242, 246), and could not constitutionally have done so since its prohibition was not restricted
to injunctions in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce
or any other subject over which Congress has paramount
power.
[18] Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
does not embody any policy that requires a state court enforcing rights created by that section to withhold injunctive
relief. The principal purpose of section 301 was to facilitate
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by making unions suable as entities in the federal courts, and thereby to remedy the one-sided character of existing labor legislation. (See United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co.,
(N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 568.) We would give ?.!together
too ironic a twist to this purpose if we held that the actual
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effect of the
was to abolish in state courts equitand leave an employer
able remedies that had been
in a worse position in
to the effective enforcement of
his contract than he >vas before the enactment of section 301.
Nothing in the nature of the rights created by section 301
that
relief be denied in their enforcement.
any federal
Such relief would of course not
contract
nor would it expand it in conflict with any
policy that we have been able to discern in the statute. To
the contrary, the principal purpose of the statute is to encourage the formation and effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. (See Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama, 25 U.S.L. Week 4387, 4388 and n. 4 (U.S.
June 3, 1957).) The restriction on the remedies available in
the federal courts arises not from any policy in the Labor
Management Relations Act itself but from the Norris-La
Guardia Act, and the policy of that statute as we have seen
is confined to the federal courts. (See .Associated Tel. Co. v.
Communication Workers, (S.D. Cal.), 114 F.Supp. 334, 341;
Philadelphia Marine Trade .Assn. v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 382 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 736], cert. denied,
350 U.S. 843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 751] ; Wollett and
Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 Stan.I1.Rev. 445, 456-460.)
[20] Finally, there is no invariable requirement, implicit
in the federal system, that a state court enforcing a federal
right must not go beyond the remedies available in a federal
court. Uniformity in the determination of the substantive
federal right itself is no doubt a necessity, but such uniformity is not threatened because a state court can give a more
complete and effective remedy. Several federal courts, proceeding on the hypothesis that substantive rights in actions
under section 301 arise out of state law, have concluded that
the federal court is not confined to the remedies available
in the state courts. (Local 205, United Elec. Workers v.
General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 94-95, aff'd on other grounds,
25 U.S.L. Week 4391 (U.S. June 3, 1957); Textile Workers
v. American Thread Co., (D. Mass), 113 F.Supp. 137, 141;
See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67
Harv.L.Rev. 591, 601.) We cannot see why, under the opposite
hypothesis, it is not equally true that a state court is not confined to remedies available in a federal court when the restriction on the federal court does not flow from the statute
creating the federal right.
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deare
from mainthe
action because the issue involved is reto arbitration under the collective bargaining agree'l'he issue defendants contend must be arbitrated is
=""n""" the strike was in breach of the contract.
III
of the contract
''it is the
and intent of the
hereto that all grievances
rlicnntac
between them over the interpretation or
of the terms of this Agreement shall be settled
the procedure set forth in Article V hereof, and that durthe term of this Agreement the Unions . . . shall not .. .
or engage in, sanction, or assist in a strike against .. .
Contractors. . . . " Article V is entitled, "Procedure
Settlement of Grievances and Disputes." In paragraph
it provides that employees are to present grievances and
to their craft steward, who will report them to a
representative. The special representative will then
to adjust the dispute with the contractor. Parae and D provide that if this method of settlement fails,
the dispute or grievance may be referred to a Joint Conference Board and from there to a Joint Arbitration Committee. If a majority vote of the Joint Arbitration Committee cannot be obtained, the grievance or dispute is to be
submitted to an arbiter whose award is final and binding.
Paragraph E repeats the provision of article III that all disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation or application of any of the terms or conditions of the contract
shall be determined by the procedure set forth in article V.
[21] The arbitrability of a dispute may itself be subject
to arbitration if the parties have so provided in their contract.
In this situation the court should stay proceedings pending
the arbiter's determination of his own jurisdiction unless it is
clear that the claim of arbitrability is wholly groundless.
(See International Union, United Automobile Workers v.
Benton Harbor Malleable Ind1tstries (6th Cir.), 242 F.2d
539, petition for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. Week 3361 (U.S.
24, 1957) ; Local 205, United Elec. etc. Workers v. General Elec. Co. (1st Cir.), 233 F.2d 85, 101, aff'd, 25 U.S.L.
Week 4391 (U.S. June 3, 1957); Scoles, Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U.Chi.L.
Rev. 616, 620-621.) [22] Of course, even when the parties
have conferred upon the arbiter the unusual power of de49 C.M---3
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termining his own
the court cannot avoid the
necessity of making a certain threshhold determination of
arbitrability, namely, v>hether the parties have in fact conferred this power on the arbiter. There is no indication in
the present contract that the parties intended any such result.
[23] It may be that leaving to an arbiter the question of
arbitrability is a desirable procedure from the point of view
of harmonious labor relations (see Arbitrability, 1951 Report
of the Committee on Improvement of Administration of
Union-Employer Contracts, Section of Labor Relations Law,
American Bar Assn., in Readings on Labor Law 172, 192-194
(Reynard ed. 1955) ) , although some have expressed fear that
the procedure may be used to bring about unbargained for
changes in the relations of the parties. (See minority report
in id. at 201.) Whatever the merits of the procedure, we
think it sufficiently outside the usual understanding of the
relations of court and arbiter and their respective functions
to assume that the parties expected a court determination
of arbitrability unless they have clearly stated otherwise.
(See Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn. v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 382 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 738], cert.
denied, 350 U. S. 843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 751] .)
Plaintiffs take the position that defendants' breach of contract is not an issue referable to arbitration because by striking in violation of the no-strike clause defendants have themselves repudiated the arbitration procedure. This argument
misconceives the question since it assumes that defendants
have in fact breached the no-strike provision, the very issue
that defendants dispute and say must go to arbitration.
[24] All strikes during the life of a contract are not necessarily violations of a no-strike clause, even though on its face
the prohibition appears to be absolute. (See The No-Strike
Clause, 1952 Report of the Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, Section of Labor
Relations Law, American Bar Assn., in Readings on Labor
Law 255, 275-277 [Reynard ed. 1955).) The question is
whether the collective bargaining agreement requires arbitration to determine if defendants' conduct violates the no-strike
clause, or whether the court itself may make this determination. As with all problems of contract interpretation, the
answer must reflect the intention of the parties.
This same question has been before the lower federal courts
on numerous occasions. Many of the decisions, although
helpful, are not determinative of the problem before us be-
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cause they turn on the language of a particular collective
bargaining agreement. Some of the decisions are in irreconcilable confiict. 1
[25] We think the trial court was right in concluding that
the parties to the contract in the present case did not contemplate arbitration of a breach of the no-strike clause. It
is true that the language of the arbitration provision is broad,
stating that ''all grievances or disputes arising between . . .
[the parties J over the interpretation or application of the
terms of this Agreement shall be settled by the procedure set
forth in Article V . . . . " If this were the only provision
to be considered, it might reasonably be argued that the
question of whether a strike is in breach of contract is arbitrable since it involves interpretation of a term of the contract. The contract, however, must be read as a whole and
the grievance and arbitration procedure viewed in the light
of its purpose.
The grievance procedure set forth in article V is designed
primarily to cope with the usual employee complaints concerning working conditions, wrongful discharge, and the like.
The first steps in the procedure require a grievance to be
submitted to a craft steward and then reported to a special
representative for adjustment. It is inconceivable that the
'International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., (1st
Cir.) 230 F.2d 576, 582-584, eert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21,
1 L.Ed.2d 37], (semble: the 1ssue is not arbitrable); Shirley-Herman
Co. v. International Hod Carriers, (2d Cir.) 182 F.2d 806 (semble: not
arbitrable); Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, (2d
Cir.) 202 F.2d 435. 436-437 (not arbitrable); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local
475, United Elec. etc. Workers, (2d Cir.) 23.5 F.2d 298, 301, cert.
denied, 25 U.S.L. Week 3366 (U.S. June 10, 1957), (arbitrable; possibly overruling the Shirley-Herman and Markel cases, supra) ;Lewittes
g- Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F.Supp. 851, 853-854 (S.D.
N.Y.) (arbitrable); Metal Polishers etc. Union v. Rubin, (E.D. Pa.)
85 F.Snpp. 363 (not arbitrable) ;Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.
v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Elec. Ry. g- Motorcoach Employees,
(W.D. Pa.) 98 F.Supp. 789, 791, rev'd on other grounds, (3d Cir.) 193
F.2d 327 (arbitrable); International Union United Furniture Workers v.
Colonial Hardu;ood Flooring Co., (4th Cir.) 168 F.2d 33, 35 (not arbitrable); United Elec. etc. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, lr10. (4th
Cir.) 215 F.2d 221, 222-223 (not arhitrable); International Union.
United Arltomobile Workers v. Benton Harbor Malleable lndrtstries.
(6th Cir.) 242 F.2d ~36, ;)40-542, petition for eert. filed, 25 U.S.L. Week
3361 (U.S. May 24. 19!i7), (not arbitrable); Hoover Motor Express Co.
v. Teamsters etc. Union, (6th Cir.) 217 F.2d 49, 53-54 (not :ubitrahle);
Square D Co. v. United Elec. etc. Workers, (E.D. Mich.) 123 F.Supp.
776, 782-783 (not arbitrable); see Philadelphia Marine .Trade Assn. v.
International Longshoremen's Assn., 3Fi2 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 737738], cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 751], (semble:
not arbitrable).

C.2d
to follow these
strike. It is possible
that they
to be presented dito the Joint Conference Board or the Joint Arbitration
Committee. The later
howof a

putes and grievances that are the
[26] A more
tion between the grievance and arbitration procedure and the
no-strike guarantee. The grievance and arbitration procedure is an alternative to the strike as a means of settling
disputes, and it is clear that the parties bound themselves to
resort to this procedure for the very purpose of avoiding the
possibility of a strike. The parties' intention is shown by the
fact that defendants' promise in article III not to resort to a
strike follows immediately after their promise to use the
grievance procedure. Moreover, the preamble to the contract states that, "it is the desire of the parties hereto to
provide, establish and put into practice effective methods
for the settlement of misunderstandings, disputes or grievances between the parties hereto to the end that the Contractors are assured continuity of operation and the members
of the Unions are assured continuity of employment, and inrlustrial peace is maintained . . . . " The grievance and arbitration procedure assumes that work goes on. Resort to the
procedure is designed to avoid the necessity of a strike, not
to adjudicate a strike once it has occurred, and the purpose
of the procedure limits its applicability. (See International
Union, United Antornobile Workers v. Benton Harbor Malleable Industries (6th Cir.), 242 F.2d 536, 540-541, petition
for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. Week 3361 (U.S. May 24, 1957).)
[27] It is urged that arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements should when possible be construed
broadly to cover all (iisputes between the parties to the end
that the contract will provide a complete system of government for the parties, a system far more satisfactory than
any the courts can provide
because established by the
parties themselves. more l
to lead to industrial peace.
We do not dispute the attrarti veness of the ideal. but it does
not justify overriding the
' intentions and forcing on
them a method of decision
unexpected in its appli-
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cation. As Mr. Justice Cardozo
out in Marchant v.
Jl ead-JJl orris on
252 N.Y. 284
N.E. 386, 391,
to shirk the process of con393], "Courts are not at
struction under the empire of a belief that arbitration is
any more than
may shirk it if their belief
to be the contrary. No one is under a duty to
resort to these conventional tribunals, however helpful their
processes,
to the extent he has signified his willingness.
'' ''
. . . are not to be trapped
a strained and unnatural construction of words of doubtful import into an abandonment of legal remedies, unwilled
and unforeseen.''
[28] There is no merit in defendants' contention that because plaintiffs did not have the contractor's license required
sections 7025-7031 of the Business and Professions Code,
they are barred from maintaining the present action by section 7031 or the common-law rule that illegal contracts will
not be enforced. Section 7031 bars actions ''for the collection
of compensation'' for contracting work, not actions to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs i!o not seek
to enforce an illegal contract; their labor contract is not
prohibited by the licensing statute and its validity is unrelated to the question whether plaintiffs can legally enter
into construction contracts. If plaintiffs failed to obtain a
partnership license, they are not for that reason completely
outside the protection of the law and denied relief from torts
committed against them or breaches of contract other than
contracts to recover compensation. (See Grant v. WeatherhoU, 123 Cal.App.2d 34. 42-44 [266 P.2d 185] .)
[29] Finally, there was sufficient evidence to justify the
issuance of the preliminary injunction. Defendants do not
deny the strike, nor on this appeal do they contend, as they
did in the trial court, that the contract was not in force at
the time of the strike or that plaintiffs were not parties to it.
The reasons for the strike are obscure. There is some indication that defendants objected to plaintiffs on the grounds that
they were labor contractors and violating state safety regulations. Defendants failed, however, to explain precisely what
labor contracting is, to show that plaintiffs were engaged
in it, or even if they were, that defendants were justified in
striking rather than resorting to the grievance procedure.
The evidence tended to show that plaintiffs had not violated
any state safety regulation. There was substantial evidence
to support plaintiffs' claim that the strike was in breach of
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contract and that they would be irreparably injured if it
continued.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER J.-I dissent.
In this case the majority holds that where there is a collective bargaining agreement between a union and employer,
with a no-strike provision, which has been violated by the
union, but there has been no unfair labor practice under the
Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.)
a state court has jurisdiction to give preventive relief against
such violation; but, however, the federal substantive law
(29 U.S.C.A. § 185) is exclusively controlling in rights and
duties under such collective bargaining agreements where
interstate commerce is affected (Textile Workers Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabmna, 353 U.S. 448 [77
S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972]) ; that state courts have jurisdiction
generally of proceedings under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act although they must apply the federal
substantive law; that in applying such law they (state courts)
may give whatever form of relief they deem proper, for
example, injltnctive relief enjoining the violation of a nostrike provision of the bargaining agreement a.s in the case
at bar. I cannot agree with this latter holding. On the contrary, it is my view that a state court may not give any more
stringent or different relief than could be given by a federal
court.
The rights under the bargaining agreement being controlled by federal law, that law must also measure the remedies
available for otherwise the federal law is not being applied.
Turning to the federal law, it is conceded by the majority
that federal courts could not give injunctive relief under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. It states:
"Some courts have broadly suggested that section 301 authorizes even federal courts to use injunctive process for the 'full
enforcement of the substantive rights created by section 301
(a) . . . ,' apparently notwithstanding the restrictions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. . . . [T]he better view would
seem to be that the inclusion of specific instances in the Labor
Management Relations Act in which injunctive relief is ex-
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pressly authorized negatives any general repeal of tke NorrisLaGuardia Act in respect to tke enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. (See W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1st Cir.) 217 F.2d 6,
8-10, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21, 1 L.Ed.2d
37]; Associated Tel. Co. v. Commttnication Workers, (S.D.
Cal.) 114 F.Supp. 334, 340-341; United Packinghouse Workers
v. Wi~son &; Co., (N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 567-568.)"
(Emphasis added.) The Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A.
§ 101 et seq.) to which reference is made prohibits injunctive
relief generally or demands compliance with certain requirements before it may be granted. If it is applicable it is
conceded that an injunction would not be available in this
case if the action were in the federal court. The majority
reasons, however, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act relates only
to the jurisdiction of federal courts, but there is nothing in
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act which
forbids an injunction and the purpose of uniformity in the
disposal of labor relations matters affecting interstate commerce is not involved. There are several reasons why those
arguments are not persuasive.
In Textae Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama, supra, 353 U.S. 448 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972],
the United States Supreme Court held that substantive federal law must apply to an action under section 301 to specifically enforce an arbitration provision in a bargaining
agreement (the action was in a federal district court) and
the Norris-La Guardia Act was not a bar because the failure
to arbitrate was not one of the abuses the Norris Act was
aimed at and the policy in favor of enforcing such agreements
expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act was clear,
but in the course of its opinion there is a clear indication
that in declaring the federal substantive law applicable it was
also including so-called procedural matters of importance
such as injunctive relief. For illustration, the court said:
''Both the Senate and the House took pains to provide for
'the usual processes of the law' by provisions which were the
substantial equivalent of § 301 (a) in its present form. Both
the Senate Report and the House Report indicate a primary
concern that unions as well as employees should be bound to
collective bargaining contracts. But there was also broader
concern-a concern with a procedure for making such agreements enforceable in the courts by either party. . . .
"Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is
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the
pro quo for an
Viewed
in this light, the
does more
diction in the federal courts over labor
expresses a federal
that federal courts should
these agreements on behalf of or
labor
and that industrial peace
be best obtained
House the debate
way. . . And when in
the
whether § 301 was more than
became
clear that the purpose of the section was
to provide the necessary
remedies. . ..
"It seems,
clear to us that
adopted a
policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes . . . . Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by look£ng at the
policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will
effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness
will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Any
state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law
and will not be an independent source of private rights.''
(Emphasis added.) Indeed the issue involved in the Textile
case was whether section 301 authorized a particular remedy,
specific enforcement, in case of breach of a bargaining agreement. I deduce from this that the federal law including the
remedies available or not available is to be applied when the
action is in the state court under section 301.
Moreover, there is additional reason why the remedy such
as injunction, should not be given by the state court if it
may not be given by a federal court. Such a remedy is more
than mere procedure. It goes to the very essence of the right
itself. In many instances it would make the difference of
whether or not the right could be truly realized. This is
especially true in injunctions in labor disputes, such as an
injunction against a strike. The case is usually won or lost
at the preliminary injunction stage, even before the hearing
on the application for a permanent injunction-the final judgment. If a preliminary injunction is obtained, economic circumstances may break the strike and render impotent the
efforts of the union to secure the goals sought by it. If it
is not secured, management and labor continue their bargaining in the manner contemplated by the law. The purpose of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to prevent injunctive restraints
in such disputes with the thought that management and labor
may have a free hand to iron out their problems.
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from 'substantive
are free to follow
To what exmay themselves dig into
'substantive
is a troublesome
at best as is
shown in the very case on which
relies. Central
Vermont R. Co. v.
238 U.S. 507
S.Ct. 865, 59
L.Ed. 1433]. Other cases in this Court
up the impossibility of laying down a
rule to distinguish 'substance' from 'procedure.' Fortunately, we need not attempt
to do so. A long series of cases
decided, from which
we see no reason to depart, makes it our duty to construe
the allegations of this complaint ourselves in order to determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial
granted him by Congress. 'l'his
cannot be defeated by the forms of local
(Emphasis added.)
And it is said: "It follows also from the rule as to supremacy
of the United States within its proper
that the individual states may not in any way
the enjoyment of federal constituiinnal or
rights.
Accordingly, a state may not
nny condition requiring
relinquishment of a
the federal Constitution; nor may it
snch conditions as it sees fit with
respect to rights created and cauiles of action conferred by an
act of congress, or defeat a federal
by forms of local
practice.'' (81 C.J.S.,
§ 7.) It is said in Mine
Workers v. Arkansas
351 U.S. 62, 75 [76 S.Ct.
559, 100 L.Ed. 941], "Sueh
the case, the state court
is governed by the federal law which has been applied to
industrial relations, like these,
interstate commerce
and the state court erred in
the peaceful picketing
here practiced. A 'Sf ate rnay not prohibit the exercise of
rights which the federal Acts protect.'" (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar the
to be not enjoined under the
Norri::;-Laflnan1ia Art
also. 29
.S.C.A. § 1
is a
part of the federal right-a part and parcel of the rights
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which may be exercised with reference to bargaining agreements. Certainly a state court cannot give more relief
(in fact, relief which will be the end of the case) than a
federal court when administering federal law. If it may,
the requirement that the federal law be applied may well
dwindle to nothing and there will be no uniformity as is
sought by the federal act in labor relations affecting interstate
commerce. The right will be no greater than the remedy
afforded for its protection which may vary from state to
state. If as in Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, supra, 338
U.S. 294, the mere matter of state rules of pleading may not
control in the enforcement of a federal law by a state court,
then certainly the important and fundamental matter of
allowing an injunction under state law cannot stand if the
federal law forbids it. In short the federal law is exclusive
in the field of bargaining agreements affecting commerce.
When a state entertains jurisdiction and applies that law it
should be bound by all the important restrictions including
those embraced in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It would not be
doubted that if section 301 which gives federal courts jurisdiction over actions involving collective bargaining agreements where interstate commerce is affected, but also provided
that no injunctive relief was available then no such relief
would be proper if the action is in a state rather than federal
court. The fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is in a separate
statute should not alter the result.
I would therefore reverse the order granting a preliminary
injunction.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied October
8, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinioll that the petition
should be granted.

